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Abstract
Physical layer security is one of the promising techniques for the security of next-generation wireless systems. In this paper,
we analyze the impact of the limited feedback link on the secrecy capacity for a system which includes a base station with
multiple antennas, a single legitimate user selected from multiple active ones and multiple eavesdroppers. We propose to
design a limited feedback link by reducing the feedback load and quantizing the channel state information (CSI) of legitimate
users to establish a secure communication system. The feedback load is decreased with a self discrimination criterion at the
legitimate users’ side while keeping the secrecy capacity constant. The best legitimate user is selected based on the quantized
CSI through a limited feedback link. We also analyze the impact of CSI of eavesdroppers, which information may or may
not be available at transmitter. In practical cases where eavesdroppers are passive and their location is not known by the
transmitter, an artificial noise is used to disrupt their reception. When the CSI of eavesdroppers is known, the generalized
singular value decomposition is applied. We illustrate the performance results of the proposed limited feedback link through
the availability of CSI of eavesdroppers at the transmitter.
Keywords Physical layer security · Reduced feedback link · Quantized feedback · Multiple antennas
1 Introduction
Security has become even more crucial issue due to the vul-
nerability of wireless networks to eavesdroppers’ attacks.
Traditionally, complex cryptographic methods are used
for secure communications in the presence of illegiti-
mate users. Rapid developments in computing technology
require these solutions to be continually evolving. On the
other hand, physical layer security techniques promise to
achieve secrecy, even if an eavesdropper has an unlimited
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computational power. As a complementary security mech-
anism to cryptographic technologies at upper layers, the
physical layer security solutions are implemented at the
physical layer. In order to achieve both confidentiality
and authentication, the physical layer security explores the
random nature of the transmission media.
The basic framework of physical layer security, the
wiretap channel model, was introduced by Wyner [1]. This
model characterizes a point to point communication sys-
tem under secrecy constraints. It consists of three nodes,
the transmitter (Alice), the receiver (Bob), and the eaves-
dropper (Eve). In his pioneering work, Wyner has defined
secrecy capacity as the maximum amount of information
that can be reliably transmitted from the transmitter to the
intended receiver. This work only considers a degraded
broadcast channel. In subsequent studies, more general
channel models have been analysed from the information
point of view. In [2], the authors showed that it is possible
to enable secure communications in non-degraded broad-
cast channels. Introduction of physical layer security in
Gaussian channels [3], small-scale fading channels [4–6],
multi-antenna channels[7–10], and relay channels [11, 12]
have followed these works.
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The studies on physical layer security mainly adopt
the secrecy capacity as the performance metric. Multiple
antennas and beamforming techniques can be employed
to increase the secrecy capacity. The knowledge of Eve’s
channel state information (CSI) plays a critical role
in determining the corresponding optimal beamforming
scheme. In the literature, ergodic secrecy sum capacity
for multiuser multiple input single output (MISO) has
been investigated and closed form expressions have been
provided according to the CSI availability of multiple Eve
at the transmitter. For the case of CSI of multiple Eve is
perfectly available at the transmitter, a generalized singular
value decomposition (GSVD)-based precoding scheme has
been presented in [10].
The presence of external passive Eve, where only
statistical knowledge of Eve’s CSI is available, has been
discussed in [13]. The case of imperfect Eve’s CSI case has
been studied in [14] and [15]. In order to guarantee positive
secrecy capacity without Eve’s CSI at the transmitter,
an artificial noise (AN) assisted beamforming has been
presented in [16, 17]. In this method, information signal
is masked with an AN signal, which is generated in the
direction of legitimate user’s null space. Thus, the reception
of Eve is disrupted and the secrecy capacity is maximized
with an optimum power allocation parameter. With perfect
knowledge of CSI of the legitimate user, it is possible to
achieve arbitrarily large secrecy capacity by increasing the
transmit power. However, the assumption of perfect CSI at
the transmitter is overly simplistic for practical applications.
The quantized CSI of legitimate user through limited
feedback link causes an AN leakage which degrades the
capacity of legitimate user. Therefore, the secrecy capacity
decreases under AN leakage [18].
In order to overcome the noise leakage problem and
to increase the secrecy capacity, the number of bits for
quantization of CSI should be increased. As the number
of legitimate users increases, the total feedback load to
send back quantized CSI to the base station becomes
even larger. In the literature, the reduction of feedback
load has not been examined for the secure MISO systems
yet. In this paper, we propose to apply a threshold based
user selection by using a self-discrimination criterion at
legitimate users’ side for the secure MISO systems with
quantized CSI. The proposed method enables us to reduce
the feedback load while keeping secrecy capacity constant.
Besides, the noisy feedback link is also considered for
the proposed secure scheme. Compared with the work in
[19], we analyze a secure communications system including
multiple eavesdroppers, which is a reasonably practical
scenario since eavesdroppers may be more sophisticated
devices than the legitimate users as examined in [20–23].
Moreover, we investigate the scenario in which the CSI
of multiple Eve’s is known at the transmitter in order to
illustrate its impact on the overall secrecy capacity under a
limited feedback link.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the system model for the secure multiuser MISO
systems for both passive eavesdroppers in which their CSI is
not known at the transmitter and active eavesdroppers where
their CSI is available at the transmitter. Section 3 presents
a threshold based user selection including the quantization
aspects. Section 4 gives the proposed secure communication
system. Section 5 provides the performance evaluations and
Section 6 gives the conclusion.
2 Systemmodel
We consider a multiuser MISO downlink system operating
under a secrecy constraint. The wireless system consists of
one base station with Nt antennas, K active legitimate users
where each user has single antenna and Ne cooperating
single antenna eavesdroppers. It is also worth to mention
that Ne cooperating single antenna eavesdroppers that are
dispersed geographically correspond to one eavesdropper
with Ne antennas. In the rest of the paper, we will consider
the system model including one Eve with Ne antennas. The
aim of Alice is to send confidential messages to the intended
Bob. In order to maximize the secrecy capacity, the user that
has the highest channel gain, Bob, is selected from the set
of active K users.
Since Eve may overhear the secret messages illegally, the
message signal is masked with AN to disrupt the reception
of Eve while guaranteeing secrecy. We assume that the CSI
of legitimate users is perfectly estimated at the receiver side.
Moreover, we assume that Alice may acquire the perfect
or the quantized CSI of legitimate users depending on
the considered scenario. In this section, eavesdroppers are
passive and they do not reveal their location. Therefore, the
transmitter has no knowledge regarding to Eve’s CSI, which
is a highly probable scenario in practical cases.
The transmitted signal vector xk constructed under AN
beamforming is expressed as,
xk = wksk + Qkak (1)
where sk is the information-bearing signal with power
E
{|sk|2
} ≤ Ps , wk ∈ CNt×1 is the precoding vector at
Alice and E {·} denotes the expectation operator. Also, ak =
[a1, a2, . . . , aNt ]T is the AN component which is a random
Gaussian vector with power E
{||ak||2
} ≤ Pa and Qk ∈
CNt×Nt is the AN beamformer with orthonormal columns
that forms the AN subspace. The beamformers wk and Qk
are determined through the available CSI of legitimate user
at Alice.
P is the total transmit power, which is equal to sum of
the information and AN signal power. Hence, Ps = αP and
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Pa = 1−αNt−1P , where α is the power allocation parameter
and its value changes between 0 and 1. As the α parameter
increases, the power allocated to the information signal
increases and the power of AN signal decreases. Thus, this
power partitioning parameter affects the secrecy capacity.
According to the availability of CSI of legitimate user at
Alice (either perfect or quantized), the α parameter should
be chosen to provide an optimum secrecy capacity.
The received signals at kth Bob and Eve are
yk = hHk wksk + hHk Qkak + nk, (2)
ye = Hewksk + HeQkak + ne, (3)
respectively, where the channel vector of kth legitimate
user is hk ∈ CNt×1, the channel matrix of eavesdropper is
denoted by He ∈ CNe×Nt , nk is the complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) modelled by CN (0, σ 2) and each
element of ne represents complex AWGN on Eve’s side with
zero mean and variance σ 2e .
The channel direction information (CDI) of hk is
expressed as,
gk = hk‖hk‖ (4)
where ‖hk‖ denotes the channel quality information (CQI),
which is assumed to be known perfectly.
The precoding vector is determined by
wk = gk . (5)
The columns of AN beamformer matrix, Qk , form an
orthonormal basis for the null space of gk defined by
gHk Qk = 01×Nt . (6)
Then, the achievable secrecy capacity with perfect CSI at
Alice is given by
C = (E {log2 (1 + SNRk)
} − E {log2
∣∣I + SNRe∣∣})+ (7)
where SNRk and SNRe denote the instantaneous signal-
noise-ratio (SNR) belonging to the kth Bob and Eve,
respectively. They are defined in [20] as
SNRk = αγ ‖hk‖ 2 (8)
where γ = P
σ 2
is the average SNR of all legitimate users,
and
SNRe = α(Hegk)(Hegk)H
×
(
σ 2e
P
I + (1 − α)
Nt − 1 (HeQk)(HeQk)
H
)−1
, (9)
where the eavesdropper’s noise variance, σ 2e is assumed
to be unknown to the transmitter, hence it is set to zero.
Therefore, we consider the worst case scenario in terms of
the secrecy capacity.
2.1 Known eve’s CSI at alice
We also consider the system model by focusing on the case
that Alice has the knowledge of Eve’s CSI. In contrast to
the case that eavesdropper is hidden and Eve’s CSI at Alice
is not available, we assume that the eavesdropper channel
is somehow detected and its CSI is obtained. This may not
be the case in practice, since in general they are passive.
Nevertheless, we examine the impact of Eve’s CSI at Alice
on the secrecy capacity and compare its performance with
AN assisted beamforming.
The transmitted signal is formed based on GSVD
[10] and the received signals at Bob and Eve are given
respectively by
yk = hHk xk + nk, (10)
ye = Hexk + ne, (11)
where xk is the transmitted signal vector along direction
max and is defined by,
xk = maxsk . (12)
The power of transmitted signal is given by E
{||xk||2
} = P .
The secrecy capacity for the case of available Eve’s CSI
at Alice can be computed as [10]
C =
{
log2(λmax(I + PhkhHk , I + P(He)HHe))
}+
(13)
where λmax denotes the largest generalized eigenvalue of
its argument pair. It is determined by the maximum of the
Rayleigh quotient by,
λmax(I + PhkhHk , I + P(He)HHe)
= max
∈CNt
H (I + PhkhHk )
H(I + P(He)HHe) . (14)
For implementation, the knowledge of He is required
at Alice to find the corresponding generalized eigenvector
max and its maximum eigenvalue λmax. The direction of
beamforming is determined along max .
3 Threshold based legitimate user selection
In secure multiuser systems, the intended legitimate user
can be scheduled according to the most favourable channel
conditions to increase the secrecy capacity. The transmitter
selects this user through available CSI at Alice. Generally,
only quantized CSI is available at Alice due to the capacity
limitations on the feedback channel. As the number of
active legitimate users, K , increases, the feedback load
also increases in multiuser multiantenna sytems. In order
to reduce this feedback load while achieving the same
secrecy capacity, we apply a threshold at the legitimate user
side to determine the ones with poor channel conditions.
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Accordingly, the legitimate users with a low channel gain
should not take part in the user selection algorithm; hence, it
is not required to feedback their CSI. Thus, only legitimate
users above this threshold send their CSI to Alice.
The threshold based selection namely the T1 criterion
applies a threshold, γth, and constructs a set U1 by selecting
the legitimate users that satisfy the following threshold
condition [24]
U1 =
{
k′ ∈ {1, 2 . . . , K} : ‖hk′‖ 2 > γth
}
. (15)
The threshold value can be obtained either analytically or
by numerically in order to guarantee an average number of
users K¯ that are fed back their instantaneous CSI to the base
station,
K¯ = KPr {k′ ∈ U1
} = KPr
{
‖hk′‖ 2 > γth
}
, (16)
where Pr {·} denotes probability expression.
The set of U1 is determined by the incomplete gamma
function γ (Nt , 1). This function can be bounded by [25][26]
[
1 − exp(−βγ ))]Nt ≤
∫ γth
0
fγ (γ )dγ ≤
[
1 − exp(−γ ))]Nt ,
(17)
where β = (Nt !)
−1
Nt and fγ (γ ) is the probability density
function with χ22Nt .
Then, we can obtain the probability to select legitimate
user k′ in U1 as
Pr
{
k′ ∈ U1
} =
Nt−1∑
b=0
exp(−γth)(γth)b
b! (18)
Thus, the average number of legitimate users that are fed
back their CSI to Alice can be determined by
K¯ = K
Nt−1∑
b=0
exp(−γth)(γth)b
b! . (19)
For the secure MISO systems, in which the average SNR
of all legitimate users are the same, the intended legitimate
user is selected at Alice as,
k = arg max
k′∈U1
‖hk′‖ 2. (20)
3.1 Secrecy capacity with quantized feedback link
Each user satisfying the T1 criterion chooses a codeword to
quantize its CDI, gk to a unit norm vector gˆk selected from
a predetermined codebook with a size of 2B where B is the
number of quantization bits. Random vector quantization
(RVQ) codebook Ck is adopted with Ck =
{
gˆk1, gˆk2 , . . . ,
gˆki , . . . , gˆ2B
}
. An optimal codeword to quantize kth CDI is
chosen by
ki = arg max
1≤i≤2B
∣∣∣gHk gˆki
∣∣∣ . (21)
After selecting the codebook index, each Bob is fed
back its CDI to Alice in B bits. A quantization error arises
because of the limited feedback link. The relation between
perfect CDI gk , and the codeword gˆk = gˆki is given as
gk = gˆk cos θk + g⊥k sin θk, (22)
where g⊥k is a unit norm vector orthogonal to
gˆk , θk = ∠(gk, gˆk) and the quantization error follows
Nt−1
Nt
δ ≤ E {sinθk} ≤ δ with δ = 2
−B
Nt−1 [27].
In the case of quantized CDI, the transmitted signal when
the CSI of Eve is not available at Alice can be denoted as
xk = wˆksk + Qˆkak, (23)
where the precoding vector is obtained though quantized
CDI by,
wˆk = gˆk, (24)
and the quantized version of AN beamformer matrix is
determined by,
gˆHk Qˆk = 01×Nt . (25)
Then, the received signals at the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper can be written as
yk = ||hk||(gkH gˆk)sk + ||hk||(gHk Qˆk)ak + nk, (26)
and
ye = Hegˆksk + HeQˆkak + ne, (27)
respectively.
Thus, the secrecy capacity with quantized CSI at the
transmitter is given by
Cq =
(
E
{
log2
(
1 + ˆSNRk
)}
− E
{
log2
∣∣∣I + ˆSNRe
∣∣∣
})+
(28)
where ˆSNRk and ˆSNRe are instantaneous SNR values for
kth legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively through a
limited feedback link.
The SNR value at kth Bob under quantized CSI can be
expressed by
ˆSNRk = α||hk||
2|gkH gˆk|2
1−α
Nt−1 ||hk||2||gkH Qˆk||2 + 1γ
. (29)
A measure of the alignment of the quantized CDI with the
exact CDI can be denoted by cos2(θk) = |gkH gˆk|2. Besides,
we can use the fact that |gkH Qˆk|2 = 1−|gkH gˆk|2 = sin2(θk)
[18].
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Then, the SNR of the kth legitimate user under quantized
CDI can be re-written by
ˆSNRk = α||hk||
2cos2(θk)
1−α
Nt−1 ||hk||2sin2(θk) + 1γ
. (30)
The SNR value at Eve under quantized feedback link can
be written as
ˆSNRe =α(Hegˆk)(Hegˆk)H
(
1 − α
Nt − 1 (H
eQˆk)(HeQˆk)H
)−1
.
(31)
In contrast to the case where Alice has perfect CSI of
legitimate user, the quantized CDI causes an AN leakage.
The noise that leaks from the intended legitimate user’s null
space, |gkH Qˆk|2 = sin2(θk), decreases the secrecy capacity.
Even when γ goes to infinity, the secrecy capacity in Eq. 28
converges to a constant value as
Cq =
(
E
{
log2
(
1 + αcos
2(θk)
1−α
Nt−1 sin
2(θk)
)
− log2
∣∣∣∣∣
I + ˆSNRe
∣∣∣∣∣
})+
. (32)
In the case of the CSI of Eve is available at the
transmitter through quantized feedback link, the quantized
versions of hk and He which are denoted by hˆk and Hˆe
are present at Alice, respectively. Thus, the direction of
beamforming,ˆmax , is not along the exact one due to the
quantization error and this fact causes a secrecy degradation.
The secrecy capacity under quantized CSI of both Eve
and Bob is given by
Cq =
{
log(λˆmax(I + P hˆkhˆHk , I + P(Hˆe)H Hˆe))
}+
, (33)
where
λˆmax(I + P hˆkhˆHk , I + P(Hˆe)H Hˆe)
= max
ˆ∈CNt
ˆH (I + P hˆkhˆHk )ˆ
ˆH (I + P(Hˆe)H Hˆe)ˆ . (34)
4 The proposed secure communication
system
In the proposed secure communications system, firstly, at
the receiver side, each legitimate user applies the T1
criterion based on the threshold value γth known by
both the transmitter and the receivers, which does not
request an additional overhead. Then, only legitimate users
whose channel gains are higher than a given threshold
are considered. This reduces the computational complex-
ity compared to the full feedback case where all legit-
imate users are quantized their CSI. After that, in the
proposed scheme, the K¯ , legitimate users are fed back their
corresponding codebook indexes, which reduces the signal-
ing overhead significantly compared the full feedback case
where all legitimate users, K are fed back their CSI. As a
result, the computational complexity and signaling overhead
are decreased since only a reduced set of legitimate users
are quantized their CSI and fed back them to the transmitter.
A pseudocode of the proposed secure communications
system by employing reduced and quantized feedback is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The proposed secure communications through
a limited feedback link
for 1 do
At th Bob :
Input: Its CQI h and its CDI, g .
Apply 1 criterion:
if h 2 then
Quantize its CDI as in Eq. (21) using its corre-
sponding codebook.
end if
Output: The index of the quantized CDI, .
end for
At Alice:
Input: The indexes and H for the case of the CSI of
Eve is available.
-Construct 1 consisting the indexes of selected legiti-
mate users which are fed back their CDI.
- For 1, obtain the perfect CQI, h and the
quantized CDI, g , through using its corresponding
codebook.
-Schedule Bob as in Eq. (20).
if CSI of Eve is available then
Provide the beamformer direction as in Eq.
(34).
else
Determine the precoding vector as in Eq. (24) and AN
beamformer as in Eq. (25).
end if
Output: Either w and Q or .
5 Performance evaluations
In this section, we present simulation results by setting
the number of transmitter antennas as Nt = 4 at Alice.
We assume that all legitimate users have the same average
SNR values and the fading effect is modeled by Rayleigh
distribution.
The threshold value of the T1 criterion is adjusted analy-
tically to get average number of users that are fed back
their CSI to the transmitter as K¯ = 4. For the number of
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Fig. 1 Secrecy capacity versus
α for different number of
quantization bits in the case that
Eve’s CSI is unknown at Alice
and Ne = 2, K = 50, γ = 20dB
active legitimate users given by K = [10, 20, 30, 40, 50],
the corresponding threshold values are determined as γth =
[4.15, 5.5, 6.2, 6.67, 7.0]. According to these threshold
values, the set of U1 is constructed and legitimate users
in this set are fed back their quantized CSI to Alice by
employing RVQ in B bits. For B = 12 and K = 50, the
total feedback load is 50 × 12 = 600 bits per channel use
for the full feedback case. If the T1 criterion is employed,
only 4 users on average are fed back their CSI to Alice and
total feedback load reduces to 4 × 12 = 48 bits per channel
use.
Figure 1 shows the optimal power allocation parameters
considering different number of feedback bits for the full
feedback (FF) case, where all users are fed back their CSI to
Alice and the T1 criterion. When Eve’s CSI is not available
at Alice, a portion of the power should be dedicated for AN
to interrupt reception of Eve. The optimal power allocation
parameter, α depends on the CSI of the legitimate users. If
the feedback bits are sufficiently large, the optimal value is
calculated by α =
√
1√
1+√Ne [20]. Then, the parameter α is
calculated as 0.414 for Ne = 2. However, as the number of
quantization bits reduces, less power should be allocated to
AN signal in order to prevent severe AN leakage such that α
converges to 1. It is also observed that the T1 criterion does
not cause a secrecy capacity degradation compared to the
full feedback case while providing a reduction on feedback
load which varies between 60% − 92% depending on the
active number legitimate users K .
Fig. 2 Secrecy capacity versus
SNR for different values of Ne
in the case of unknown ECSIT
and perfect Bob’s CSI at Alice
for K = 50
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Fig. 3 Secrecy capacity versus
SNR for Ne in the case of
perfect ECSIT and perfect Bob’s
CSI at Alice for K = 50
In Figs. 2 and 3, for the case of perfect CSI of legitimate
users are available at Alice, the effect of the number of
antennas at Eve is analyzed for both Eve’s CSI is not
available (unknown ECSIT) and is known at Alice (known
ECSIT) perfectly, respectively. For the unknown ECSIT
scenario, the optimal α values are used to maximize the
secrecy capacity based on the performance results in Fig. 1.
As observed from the results, the secrecy capacity is not
bounded and can be increased with SNR for Nt ≥ Ne + 1.
Besides, the gain on secrecy capacity compared to known
and unknown ECSIT is given about 1.5 bps/Hz when
the number of Eve’s antennas is less than the number of
antennas at Alice.
In Fig. 4, the secrecy capacity is illustrated for different
number of quantization bits for the CSI of both legitimate
users and Eve through a limited feedback link. According
to the results, an increment in SNR causes a loss in the
secrecy capacity since Eve has more antennas than the
intended user and beamforming is no longer in the optimal
direction. This situation is in sharp contrast to the case of
the perfect CSI. In Fig. 5, the secrecy capacity for different
number of quantization bits for the CSI of legitimate user
Fig. 4 Secrecy capacity versus
SNR in the case of quantized
ECSIT and quantized Bob’s CSI
at Alice for Ne = 2, K = 50
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Fig. 5 Secrecy capacity versus
SNR in the case of unknown
ECSIT and quantized Bob’s CSI
at Alice for Ne = 2, α = 0.8,
K = 50.
is illustrated when Eve’s CSI is unknown at Alice. When
the number of quantization bits is increased, the gain on
the secrecy capacity is also increased since the leakage to
Eve is reduced. It shows that if the number of quantization
bits is adequately chosen, it is possible to provide secrecy
gain with SNR increment in contrast to quantized ECSIT
case.
In Fig. 6, we compare the secrecy capacity for the case
of known ECSIT and unknown ECSIT by employing the
full feedback case and the T1 criterion through the limited
feedback link. When both Bob’s CSI and Eve’s CSI are
perfectly known at Alice, the eavesdropper is not allowed
to infer any information. However, the feedback channel
is limited and the quantized CSI is available at Alice
in practical systems. When the quantized Eve’s CSI and
quantized Bob’s CSI are available at Alice, the secrecy
capacity is lower than the case of unknown Eve’s CSI. The
case of the quantized Bob’s CSI and unknown Eve’s CSI
at Alice provides about 1.5 bps/Hz gain on the secrecy
capacity compared the quantized Eve’s CSI is available at
Alice for both the full feedback case and the T1 criterion.
In Fig. 7, the secrecy capacity performance under the
noisy feedback link is illustrated for both the full feedback
case and the T1 algorithm. According to the results, the loss
on the secrecy capacity is only about 0.4 bps/Hz under a
severe feedback channel condition.
Fig. 6 Secrecy capacity versus
K for different availability of
CSI for γ = 20dB
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Fig. 7 Secrecy capacity versus
K under a noisy feedback link
for γ = 20dB, B = 8,
γUL = 0dB
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have applied the threshold-based legitimate
user selection for the multiuser MISO systems having
multiple antennas eavesdropper under secrecy constraints
while reducing the feedback load. We have considered
different availability cases of Eve’s CSI at Alice and the
quantized CSI of legitimate users in order to analyze
the impact the limited feedback link on the secrecy
capacity. It has been shown that the proposed limited
feedback link achieves the same secrecy capacity as the full
feedback scheme for all considered cases. The availability
of quantized Eve’s CSI at Alice has not provide any
gain on the secrecy capacity compared to the unknown
case which is most suitable for practical applications. The
proposed secure multiuser MISO system though the limited
feedback link is compatible with the existing wireless
communications systems since it does not require additional
overhead.
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